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What is ultimately real? Is there a fixed nature to reality? If so, is that nature knowable by the human mind? Philosophers have been confronted with these questions
since the very inception of philosophy in ancient Greece. In the history of philosophy
various answers to these intellectual riddles have been articulated. As a general rule,
the metaphysical issues concerning the ultimate nature of reality have been dealt with
from what we could call, along with Joseph Margolis, the perspective of archism.1 A
vast majority of philosophers have constructed their theories under the tacit assumption that there is a way things are in themselves, and that reality possesses invariant,
primitive structures that make it so. Except for sceptics and nihilists, hardly any
Western thinkers have contested the very foundational idea of metaphysics (and until
recently, also science) which holds that reality is made up of primitive particulars. An
extremely important exception to this general rule was Justus Buchler, a philosopher
who influenced an entire generation of American philosophers, such as Richard J.
Bernstein, Kathleen Wallace, and John Ryder, to name a few.
The philosophy of the Columbia naturalists (e.g., John Dewey and John Herman Randall, Jr.) never had an easy time in the philosophical history of the United
States. As Charles Hartshorne wrote, Buchler’s version of naturalism, the ordinal
metaphysics, was very difficult to persuasively argue for because “the entire history
of philosophy is against such an idea. Only considerable courage could have made
it seem worthwhile to challenge this tradition.”2 Likewise, Richard Bernstein undoubtedly has a point when he says that, “A philosopher like Buchler who attempts
to break away from ‘school philosophy’ is taking a serious risk. With the introduction of novel terminology, categories, and distinctions, we may be left hanging in
mid-air, unable or unwilling to see their relevance to what has become familiar
and accepted in philosophic investigation.”3 The unusual character of Buchler’s
philosophy thus requires, every once in a while, new explications and clarifications,
not because it is unclear, but rather because it challenges our deeply-rooted ideas
about how metaphysics should be done.
The Things in Heaven and Earth, a new book by John Ryder, one of Buchler’s
last students, should be viewed from this perspective. In fact, it also intends to be a
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lot more. The corpus of Ryder’s book is divided into three parts, which break down
into eleven chapters. As the title of the book suggests, it unfolds along the stylistic
line of an essay. Even though Buchler’s metaphysics does not belong to the traditional philosophical canon, the book proceeds from a methodologically sound, even
traditional, point of view. It first familiarizes the reader with problems in today’s
conception of naturalism, introduces the key concepts of Buchler’s ordinal metaphysics and subsequently applies it to areas as varied as religion, art, and politics.
The driving assumption throughout Ryder’s book is that there is no good
philosophical reason for traditional metaphysical inquiries. The sort of questions
we should be posing, according to Columbia naturalists, is not whether this or that
is “really real” but in what sense it is real, that is, what role a particular concept
plays in our experience. The central tenet of Columbia naturalism is the principle
of ontological parity, according to which all objects (natural complexes) share an
equal claim to being real. At the outset of the book, Ryder takes pains to explain
the reason why Columbia naturalism should not be mistaken for the conventional,
scientistic version of naturalism, shaped in the 1960s by philosophers such as
W. V. O. Quine. Although both believe that all that exists is nature, they are in substantial disagreement about what this means for inquiry. Conventional naturalists
claim that the only way to describe and explain nature is by means of the natural
sciences, thus implying that the objects posited by natural science are the only
things there are ultimately real. This approach, as Ryder argues, leads inevitably
to reductionism and neglects a significant part of our experience not articulable
in the terms of natural science.
In one sense, the Columbia naturalists and classical pragmatists agree on the
principle of ontological parity. Neither would try to argue in favor of reductionism,
claiming that it is just physical reality that ultimately exists and that the world of our
ideas is just derivative of that reality (or the other way around). There is, however, a
certain way in which pragmatism and Columbia naturalism crucially diverge. As
Ryder remarks, for pragmatists such as Dewey, it is experience that constitutes the
context in which nature unfolds. For the Columbia naturalists, the central category
is nature, whereas experience is only an aspect of it.4 Ryder’s book, however, tries
to reconcile pragmatism and Columbia naturalism into what he calls “pragmatic
naturalism.” According to Ryder, pragmatic naturalism can also provide us with
the right conceptual apparatus to bring constructionism5 and objectivism under
one roof. Thus, the first two parts of the book can be seen as striving to bring a more
objective naturalism into closer company with pragmatism. Favoring the notion of
experience over nature, pragmatic naturalism leans towards a more epistemologically constructivist perspective. This venture also has, according to Ryder, a direct
impact on contemporary debates between modernists and postmodernists.6 For
Ryder, the key value of pragmatic naturalism lies in the fact that it is possible to
simultaneously endorse the following four statements:
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Natural phenomena have objectively determinable traits.
The traits of natural phenomena are knowable.
The process of inquiry is necessarily conditioned and perspectival.
Human interaction with the rest of nature, cognitive or otherwise, is
active and creative.
I do not think Ryder succeeded in proving that all of these statements can
hang together. Nowhere in the book has Ryder demonstrated how we could reconcile pragmatism with any position which would assert the intelligibility of the
concept of an experience-transcending reality. In any inquiry, do we learn about an
independent reality or do we learn about our interactions with what we postulate to
be an independent reality? I personally favor the second option, simply because the
only intelligible content the term ‘independent reality’ possesses is normative. In
other words, the notion of an independent reality works as a regulative hypothesis of
inquiry, not as an object to be inquired into. I do not see how a pragmatically sound
metaphysics could change that. I also do not believe that classical pragmatism, in
its identification of being and cognizability, allows us to meaningfully hold that
“natural entities possess traits independently of us and that we can know something about them.”7 Does the very predicate “to be a trait” make sense apart from
the process of inquiry? What difference does it make to our picture of the world or
the process of inquiry if we insist that they exist independently of us?
Overall, Ryder does an excellent job elucidating Buchler’s key concepts: natural complex, order, trait, natural definition, prevalence, and alescence. The problem
arises when he wants to “smuggle in” the objectivism/relativism controversy, which
I doubt was of much interest to Buchler himself. What are we to make of expressions like “objective” and “socially constructed traits”?8 How are we to distinguish
them? Isn’t this the kind of vocabulary we want to avoid? Ryder seems to argue that
an objective trait is something that exists independently (prior to) our acts of cognition. Take the example of the American continent.9 America, as a general idea (a
network of values, images, etc.) did not exist prior to its “discovery” by Columbus.
However, according to Ryder, its topography existed independently of us. Both
traits are constitutive of the natural complex “America”—first, being socially constructed and second being objective. However, are not both equal? What difference
would it have made in 1491 to talk of the topography of America as opposed to, for
instance, the very idea of America? In my estimation, it would not have made any
difference at the time (both these terms would have lacked pragmatic meaning, as
C. S. Peirce holds), just as it does not make any difference now (both can be seen
as equally “constructed”).
My criticism is, however, in no way meant to degrade the immense value of
the book itself. Ryder’s clear and persuasive depiction of the conceptual framework
by means of which we can see reality as radically relational,is noteworthy. Moreover,
Buchler’s picture of nature as something that completely lacks primitive individuals
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(in the metaphysical sense) is something that accords with what we know from the
best natural sciences of today.10 In this sense, Buchler’s ordinal metaphysics, upon
proper development, could also address empirically irresponsible analytic metaphysics, for example, the notion of bare particulars which is inconsistent with today’s best physics.
Ryder also applies Buchler’s ordinal metaphysics to the realm of politics and
social relations in general. I agree with Ryder when he writes that nothing prevents
contemporary societies from addressing their vital problems more than Margaret
Thatcher’s notion that there is no such thing as society. The idea that society exists,
still lurking in the subconscious of a significant part of our political representation, might be politically mobilizing, but in the pragmatist view, as well as in the
perspective of ordinal metaphysics, it is ontologically mistaken. Society, along with
the rest of nature, is relational all the way down. In the last part of Ryder’s book,
which I find the most appealing and philosophically innovative, he makes clear
what it actually means to think of democracy, social experience, and cosmopolitanism in relational terms.
To sum up, despite certain problematic passages, especially in the first part of
the book, John Ryder’s long awaited monograph The Things in Heaven and Earth:
An Essay in Pragmatic Naturalism is an enormous success. It not only revives one of
the most provocative and extraordinary philosophical traditions in the American
thought, it also takes ordinal metaphysics where it has never been before. In a purely
pragmatic manner (pace Dewey), it shows how metaphysics does matter in everyday life and politics. I highly recommend the book as an intellectually challenging primary source in the areas of ordinal metaphysics and American philosophy.
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